/* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.5 2014/07/11 00:38:17 matthew Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Google Inc. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #define ASSERT_EQ(a, b) assert((a) == (b)) #define ASSERT_NE(a, b) assert((a) != (b)) #define ASSERT_GE(a, b) assert((a) >= (b)) /* 128 bits of random data. */ static const char secret[16] = { 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xba, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x0c, 0xb0, 0xd6, 0xd4, 0xe3, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x5f, 0x96, }; enum { SECRETCOUNT = 64, SECRETBYTES = SECRETCOUNT * sizeof(secret) }; static char altstack[SIGSTKSZ + SECRETBYTES]; static void setup_stack(void) { const stack_t sigstk = { .ss_sp = altstack, .ss_size = sizeof(altstack), }; ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(&sigstk, NULL)); } static void assert_on_stack(void) { stack_t cursigstk; ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(NULL, &cursigstk)); ASSERT_EQ(SS_ONSTACK, cursigstk.ss_flags & (SS_DISABLE|SS_ONSTACK)); } static void call_on_stack(void (*fn)(int)) { /* * This is a bit more complicated than strictly necessary, but * it ensures we don't have any flaky test failures due to * inherited signal masks/actions/etc. * * On systems where SA_ONSTACK is not supported, this could * alternatively be implemented using makecontext() or * pthread_attr_setstack(). */ const struct sigaction sigact = { .sa_handler = fn, .sa_flags = SA_ONSTACK, }; struct sigaction oldsigact; sigset_t sigset, oldsigset; /* First, block all signals. */ ASSERT_EQ(0, sigemptyset(&sigset)); ASSERT_EQ(0, sigfillset(&sigset)); ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &oldsigset)); /* Next setup the signal handler for SIGUSR1. */ ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sigact, &oldsigact)); /* Raise SIGUSR1 and momentarily unblock it to run the handler. */ ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGUSR1)); ASSERT_EQ(0, sigdelset(&sigset, SIGUSR1)); ASSERT_EQ(-1, sigsuspend(&sigset)); ASSERT_EQ(EINTR, errno); /* Restore the original signal action, stack, and mask. */ ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &oldsigact, NULL)); ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldsigset, NULL)); } static void populate_secret(char *buf, size_t len) { int i, fds[2]; ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(fds)); for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(secret), write(fds[1], secret, sizeof(secret))); ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[1])); ASSERT_EQ(len, read(fds[0], buf, len)); ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[0])); } static int count_secrets(const char *buf) { int res = 0; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) { if (memcmp(buf + i * sizeof(secret), secret, sizeof(secret)) == 0) res += 1; } return (res); } static char * test_without_bzero() { char buf[SECRETBYTES]; assert_on_stack(); populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf)); char *res = memmem(altstack, sizeof(altstack), buf, sizeof(buf)); ASSERT_NE(NULL, res); return (res); } static char * test_with_bzero() { char buf[SECRETBYTES]; assert_on_stack(); populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf)); char *res = memmem(altstack, sizeof(altstack), buf, sizeof(buf)); ASSERT_NE(NULL, res); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); return (res); } static void do_test_without_bzero(int signo) { char *buf = test_without_bzero(); ASSERT_GE(count_secrets(buf), 1); } static void do_test_with_bzero(int signo) { char *buf = test_with_bzero(); ASSERT_EQ(count_secrets(buf), 0); } int main() { setup_stack(); /* * Solaris and OS X clobber the signal stack after returning to the * normal stack, so we need to inspect altstack while we're still * running on it. Unfortunately, this means we risk clobbering the * buffer ourselves. * * To minimize this risk, test_with{,out}_bzero() are responsible for * locating the offset of their buf variable within altstack, and * and returning that address. Then we can simply memcmp() repeatedly * to count how many instances of secret we found. */ /* * First, test that if we *don't* call explicit_bzero, that we * *are* able to find at least one instance of the secret data still * on the stack. This sanity checks that call_on_stack() and * populate_secret() work as intended. */ memset(altstack, 0, sizeof(altstack)); call_on_stack(do_test_without_bzero); /* * Now test with a call to explicit_bzero() and check that we * *don't* find any instances of the secret data. */ memset(altstack, 0, sizeof(altstack)); call_on_stack(do_test_with_bzero); return (0); }