/* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2001-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../../internal.h" #include "../aes/internal.h" #include "../cpucap/internal.h" #include "../delocate.h" #include "../modes/internal.h" #include "internal.h" OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push)) OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable : 4702)) // Unreachable code. #define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12 #if defined(BSAES) static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, size_t blocks, const AES_KEY *key, const uint8_t ivec[16]) { // |bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| is faster than |vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks|, // but it takes at least one full 8-block batch to amortize the conversion. if (blocks < 8) { vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, blocks, key, ivec); return; } size_t bsaes_blocks = blocks; if (bsaes_blocks % 8 < 6) { // |bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks| internally works in 8-block batches. If the // final batch is too small (under six blocks), it is faster to loop over // |vpaes_encrypt|. Round |bsaes_blocks| down to a multiple of 8. bsaes_blocks -= bsaes_blocks % 8; } AES_KEY bsaes; vpaes_encrypt_key_to_bsaes(&bsaes, key); bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, bsaes_blocks, &bsaes, ivec); OPENSSL_cleanse(&bsaes, sizeof(bsaes)); in += 16 * bsaes_blocks; out += 16 * bsaes_blocks; blocks -= bsaes_blocks; uint8_t new_ivec[16]; memcpy(new_ivec, ivec, 12); uint32_t ctr = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(ivec + 12) + bsaes_blocks; CRYPTO_store_u32_be(new_ivec + 12, ctr); // Finish any remaining blocks with |vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks|. vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(in, out, blocks, key, new_ivec); } #endif // BSAES typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; block128_f block; union { cbc128_f cbc; ctr128_f ctr; } stream; } EVP_AES_KEY; typedef struct { GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; // AES key schedule to use int key_set; // Set if key initialised int iv_set; // Set if an iv is set uint8_t *iv; // Temporary IV store int ivlen; // IV length int taglen; int iv_gen; // It is OK to generate IVs ctr128_f ctr; } EVP_AES_GCM_CTX; typedef struct { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; const uint8_t *iv; // Indicates if an IV has been set. } EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX; static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, int enc) { int ret; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data; const int mode = ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE_MASK; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { switch (ctx->key_len) { case 16: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_ctr); break; case 32: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_ctr); break; } } if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) && !enc) { if (hwaes_capable()) { ret = aes_hw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = aes_hw_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt; } } else if (bsaes_capable() && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { assert(vpaes_capable()); ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); if (ret == 0) { vpaes_decrypt_key_to_bsaes(&dat->ks.ks, &dat->ks.ks); } // If |dat->stream.cbc| is provided, |dat->block| is never used. dat->block = NULL; dat->stream.cbc = bsaes_cbc_encrypt; } else if (vpaes_capable()) { ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = vpaes_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; #if defined(VPAES_CBC) if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = vpaes_cbc_encrypt; } #endif } else { ret = aes_nohw_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = aes_nohw_decrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt; } } } else if (hwaes_capable()) { ret = aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = aes_hw_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = aes_hw_cbc_encrypt; } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { dat->stream.ctr = aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } } else if (vpaes_capable()) { ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = vpaes_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; #if defined(VPAES_CBC) if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = vpaes_cbc_encrypt; } #endif if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) { #if defined(BSAES) assert(bsaes_capable()); dat->stream.ctr = vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes; #elif defined(VPAES_CTR32) dat->stream.ctr = vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; #endif } } else { ret = aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &dat->ks.ks); dat->block = aes_nohw_encrypt; dat->stream.cbc = NULL; if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { dat->stream.cbc = aes_nohw_cbc_encrypt; } } if (ret < 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data; if (dat->stream.cbc) { (*dat->stream.cbc)(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt); } else if (ctx->encrypt) { CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block); } else { CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, dat->block); } return 1; } static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size; EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data; if (len < bl) { return 1; } len -= bl; for (size_t i = 0; i <= len; i += bl) { (*dat->block)(in + i, out + i, &dat->ks.ks); } return 1; } static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data; if (dat->stream.ctr) { CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &ctx->num, dat->stream.ctr); } else { CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, ctx->buf, &ctx->num, dat->block); } return 1; } static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_KEY *dat = (EVP_AES_KEY *)ctx->cipher_data; CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv, &ctx->num, dat->block); return 1; } ctr128_f aes_ctr_set_key(AES_KEY *aes_key, GCM128_KEY *gcm_key, block128_f *out_block, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_bytes) { // This function assumes the key length was previously validated. assert(key_bytes == 128 / 8 || key_bytes == 192 / 8 || key_bytes == 256 / 8); if (hwaes_capable()) { aes_hw_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key); if (gcm_key != NULL) { CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_hw_encrypt, 1); } if (out_block) { *out_block = aes_hw_encrypt; } return aes_hw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } if (vpaes_capable()) { vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key); if (out_block) { *out_block = vpaes_encrypt; } if (gcm_key != NULL) { CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, vpaes_encrypt, 0); } #if defined(BSAES) assert(bsaes_capable()); return vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes; #elif defined(VPAES_CTR32) return vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; #else return NULL; #endif } aes_nohw_set_encrypt_key(key, (int)key_bytes * 8, aes_key); if (gcm_key != NULL) { CRYPTO_gcm128_init_key(gcm_key, aes_key, aes_nohw_encrypt, 0); } if (out_block) { *out_block = aes_nohw_encrypt; } return aes_nohw_ctr32_encrypt_blocks; } #if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) #define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING (4 + 8) #else #define EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING 8 #endif static EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT( alignof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) <= 16, EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_needs_more_alignment_than_this_function_provides) // |malloc| guarantees up to 4-byte alignment on 32-bit and 8-byte alignment // on 64-bit systems, so we need to adjust to reach 16-byte alignment. assert(ctx->cipher->ctx_size == sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING); char *ptr = ctx->cipher_data; #if defined(OPENSSL_32_BIT) assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 4 == 0); ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 4; #endif assert((uintptr_t)ptr % 8 == 0); ptr += (uintptr_t)ptr & 8; return (EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *)ptr; } static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx); if (!iv && !key) { return 1; } switch (ctx->key_len) { case 16: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm); break; case 32: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm); break; } if (key) { OPENSSL_memset(&gctx->gcm, 0, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); gctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gctx->ks.ks, &gctx->gcm.gcm_key, NULL, key, ctx->key_len); // If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV. if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set) { iv = gctx->iv; } if (iv) { CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; } gctx->key_set = 1; } else { // If key set use IV, otherwise copy if (gctx->key_set) { CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, iv, gctx->ivlen); } else { OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen); } gctx->iv_set = 1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; } return 1; } static void aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c); OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm)); if (gctx->iv != c->iv) { OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); } } static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(c); switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_INIT: gctx->key_set = 0; gctx->iv_set = 0; gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len; gctx->iv = c->iv; gctx->taglen = -1; gctx->iv_gen = 0; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: if (arg <= 0) { return 0; } // Allocate memory for IV if needed if (arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH && arg > gctx->ivlen) { if (gctx->iv != c->iv) { OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv); } gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg); if (!gctx->iv) { return 0; } } gctx->ivlen = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN: *(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt) { return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg); gctx->taglen = arg; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG: if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt || gctx->taglen < 0) { return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg); return 1; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED: // Special case: -1 length restores whole IV if (arg == -1) { OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_gen = 1; return 1; } // Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field // at least 8. if (arg < 4 || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8) { return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg); // |RAND_bytes| calls within the fipsmodule should be wrapped with state // lock functions to avoid updating the service indicator with the DRBG // functions. FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); if (c->encrypt && !RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg)) { FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); return 0; } FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); gctx->iv_gen = 1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN: { if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0) { return 0; } CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen) { arg = gctx->ivlen; } OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg); // Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size, so no need to check // wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. uint8_t *ctr = gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8; CRYPTO_store_u64_be(ctr, CRYPTO_load_u64_be(ctr) + 1); gctx->iv_set = 1; return 1; } case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV: if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt) { return 0; } OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); gctx->iv_set = 1; return 1; case EVP_CTRL_COPY: { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(out); // |EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy| copies this generically, but we must redo it in // case |out->cipher_data| and |in->cipher_data| are differently aligned. OPENSSL_memcpy(gctx_out, gctx, sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX)); if (gctx->iv == c->iv) { gctx_out->iv = out->iv; } else { gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_memdup(gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen); if (!gctx_out->iv) { return 0; } } return 1; } default: return -1; } } static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = aes_gcm_from_cipher_ctx(ctx); // If not set up, return error if (!gctx->key_set) { return -1; } if (!gctx->iv_set) { return -1; } if (len > INT_MAX) { // This function signature can only express up to |INT_MAX| bytes encrypted. // // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/494): Make the internal |EVP_CIPHER| // calling convention |size_t|-clean. return -1; } if (in) { if (out == NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len)) { return -1; } } else if (ctx->encrypt) { if (gctx->ctr) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len, gctx->ctr)) { return -1; } } else { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) { return -1; } } } else { if (gctx->ctr) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len, gctx->ctr)) { return -1; } } else { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks.ks, in, out, len)) { return -1; } } } return (int)len; } else { if (!ctx->encrypt) { if (gctx->taglen < 0 || !CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen)) { return -1; } gctx->iv_set = 0; return 0; } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16); gctx->taglen = 16; // Don't reuse the IV gctx->iv_set = 0; return 0; } } static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!iv && !key) { return 1; } if (key) { // Verify that the two keys are different. // // This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's // September 2004 paper: // // "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and // Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC". // (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf) // // FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states // that: // "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place // BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process // data with them." // // key_len is two AES keys if (OPENSSL_memcmp(key, key + ctx->key_len / 2, ctx->key_len / 2) == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS); return 0; } if (enc) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = AES_encrypt; } else { AES_set_decrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks1.ks); xctx->xts.block1 = AES_decrypt; } AES_set_encrypt_key(key + ctx->key_len / 2, ctx->key_len * 4, &xctx->ks2.ks); xctx->xts.block2 = AES_encrypt; xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1.ks; } if (iv) { xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2.ks; OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16); } return 1; } static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2 || !out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { return 0; } // Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by // IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007 // indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT. // NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit. if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (hwaes_xts_available()) { return aes_hw_xts_cipher(in, out, len, xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2, ctx->iv, ctx->encrypt); } else { return CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len, ctx->encrypt); } } static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = c->cipher_data; if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr; EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = out->cipher_data; if (xctx->xts.key1) { if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1.ks) { return 0; } xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1.ks; } if (xctx->xts.key2) { if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2.ks) { return 0; } xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2.ks; } return 1; } else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT) { return -1; } // key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set xctx->xts.key1 = NULL; xctx->xts.key2 = NULL; return 1; } static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, int enc) { EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = ctx->cipher_data; if (iv == NULL && key == NULL) { return 1; } if (key != NULL) { if (ctx->encrypt) { AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &wctx->ks.ks); } else { AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, &wctx->ks.ks); } if (iv == NULL) { wctx->iv = NULL; } } if (iv != NULL) { OPENSSL_memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->cipher->iv_len); wctx->iv = ctx->iv; } return 1; } static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen) { EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = ctx->cipher_data; // There is no final operation, so we always return zero length here. if (in == NULL) { return 0; } // Internal calls to |AES_wrap/unwrap_key| within the fipsmodule should be // wrapped with state lock functions to avoid updating the service indicator. // When consuming via |EVP_CIPHER|, |EVP_CipherFinal(_ex)| should be the // function that indicates approval. int ret; FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); if (ctx->encrypt) { ret = AES_wrap_key(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen); } else { ret = AES_unwrap_key(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv, out, in, inlen); } FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); return ret; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_cbc) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_cbc; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 16; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_ctr) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 16; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_ecb_generic) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_ofb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_ofb128; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 16; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_128_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 16; out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING; out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER; out->init = aes_gcm_init_key; out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher; out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup; out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_cbc) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_cbc; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 24; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_ctr) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 24; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_ecb_generic) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 24; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_ofb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_ofb128; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 24; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_192_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 24; out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING; out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER; out->init = aes_gcm_init_key; out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher; out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup; out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_cbc) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_cbc; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 32; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_cbc_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_ctr) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 32; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ctr_cipher; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_ecb_generic) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 32; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ecb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_ofb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_ofb128; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 32; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_ofb_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_wrap) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap; out->block_size = 8; out->key_len = 32; out->iv_len = 8; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT; out->init = aes_wrap_init_key; out->cipher = aes_wrap_cipher; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 32; out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING; out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER; out->init = aes_gcm_init_key; out->cipher = aes_gcm_cipher; out->cleanup = aes_gcm_cleanup; out->ctrl = aes_gcm_ctrl; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_CIPHER, EVP_aes_256_xts) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_xts; out->block_size = 1; out->key_len = 64; out->iv_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY; out->init = aes_xts_init_key; out->cipher = aes_xts_cipher; out->ctrl = aes_xts_ctrl; } #if defined(HWAES_ECB) static int aes_hw_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) { size_t bl = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (len < bl) { return 1; } aes_hw_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, ctx->cipher_data, ctx->encrypt); return 1; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_128_ecb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_128_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 16; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_192_ecb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_192_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 24; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher; } DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_hw_256_ecb) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); out->nid = NID_aes_256_ecb; out->block_size = 16; out->key_len = 32; out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY); out->flags = EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE; out->init = aes_init_key; out->cipher = aes_hw_ecb_cipher; } #define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits) \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \ if (hwaes_capable()) { \ return aes_hw_##keybits##_ecb(); \ } \ return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic(); \ } #else #define EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(keybits) \ const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keybits##_ecb(void) { \ return aes_##keybits##_ecb_generic(); \ } #endif // HWAES_ECB EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(128) EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(192) EVP_ECB_CIPHER_FUNCTION(256) #define EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN 16 struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx { union { double align; AES_KEY ks; } ks; GCM128_KEY gcm_key; ctr128_f ctr; }; static int aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx, size_t *out_tag_len, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t tag_len) { const size_t key_bits = key_len * 8; switch (key_bits) { case 128: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_128_gcm); break; case 256: boringssl_fips_inc_counter(fips_counter_evp_aes_256_gcm); break; } if (key_bits != 128 && key_bits != 192 && key_bits != 256) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; // EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. } if (tag_len == EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) { tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; } if (tag_len > EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TAG_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } gcm_ctx->ctr = aes_ctr_set_key(&gcm_ctx->ks.ks, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, NULL, key, key_len); *out_tag_len = tag_len; return 1; } OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >= sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx), AEAD_state_is_too_small) OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx), AEAD_state_has_insufficient_alignment) static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state; size_t actual_tag_len; if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) { return 0; } ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len; return 1; } static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {} static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl( const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, size_t tag_len) { if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } if (nonce_len == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm)); OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len); if (ad_len > 0 && !CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) { return 0; } if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) { return 0; } } else { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) { return 0; } } if (extra_in_len) { if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag, extra_in_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) { return 0; } } else { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gcm, key, extra_in, out_tag, extra_in_len)) { return 0; } } } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len); *out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len; return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter( const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state; return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl( gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len); } static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len, size_t tag_len) { uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN]; if (nonce_len == 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } if (in_tag_len != tag_len) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } const AES_KEY *key = &gcm_ctx->ks.ks; GCM128_CONTEXT gcm; OPENSSL_memset(&gcm, 0, sizeof(gcm)); OPENSSL_memcpy(&gcm.gcm_key, &gcm_ctx->gcm_key, sizeof(gcm.gcm_key)); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gcm, key, nonce, nonce_len); if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gcm, ad, ad_len)) { return 0; } if (gcm_ctx->ctr) { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len, gcm_ctx->ctr)) { return 0; } } else { if (!CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gcm, key, in, out, in_len)) { return 0; } } CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state; if (!aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len)) { return 0; } AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx); return 1; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 16; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_128_GCM_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 24; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_192_GCM_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 32; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_256_GCM_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; } static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) { if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) { if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; } if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) { return 0; } ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce( const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { if (external_nonce_len != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH]; if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } // |RAND_bytes| calls within the fipsmodule should be wrapped with state lock // functions to avoid updating the service indicator with the DRBG functions. FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state(); RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state(); const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state; if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) { return 0; } assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len); memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); *out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce); // Only internal IV for AES-GCM is approved. AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx); return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce( const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { if (external_nonce_len != 0) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state; int ret = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl( gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH); // Only internal IV for AES-GCM is approved. if (ret) { AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx); } return ret; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 16; out->nonce_len = 0; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_128_GCM_RANDNONCE_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 32; out->nonce_len = 0; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_256_GCM_RANDNONCE_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce; } struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx; uint64_t min_next_nonce; }; OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >= sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx), AEAD_state_is_too_small) OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx), AEAD_state_has_insufficient_alignment) static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *)&ctx->state; gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0; size_t actual_tag_len; if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) { return 0; } ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len; return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter( const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *)&ctx->state; if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } // The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. uint64_t given_counter = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t)); if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX || given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE); return 0; } gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1; if (aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len)) { AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx); return 1; } return 0; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 16; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_128_GCM_TLS12_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 32; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_256_GCM_TLS12_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; } struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx { struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx; uint64_t min_next_nonce; uint64_t mask; uint8_t first; }; OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(((EVP_AEAD_CTX *)NULL)->state) >= sizeof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx), AEAD_state_is_too_small) OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(union evp_aead_ctx_st_state) >= alignof(struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx), AEAD_state_has_insufficient_alignment) static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, size_t requested_tag_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *)&ctx->state; gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = 0; gcm_ctx->first = 1; size_t actual_tag_len; if (!aead_aes_gcm_init_impl(&gcm_ctx->gcm_ctx, &actual_tag_len, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) { return 0; } ctx->tag_len = actual_tag_len; return 1; } static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter( const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len, const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *)&ctx->state; if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } // The given nonces must be strictly monotonically increasing. See // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-5.3 for details of the TLS 1.3 // nonce construction. uint64_t given_counter = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(nonce + nonce_len - sizeof(uint64_t)); if (gcm_ctx->first) { // In the first call the sequence number will be zero and therefore the // given nonce will be 0 ^ mask = mask. gcm_ctx->mask = given_counter; gcm_ctx->first = 0; } given_counter ^= gcm_ctx->mask; if (given_counter == UINT64_MAX || given_counter < gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE); return 0; } gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = given_counter + 1; if (aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in, in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len)) { AEAD_GCM_verify_service_indicator(ctx); return 1; } return 0; } #define AEAD_AES_GCM_TLS13_STATE_SERDE_VERSION 1 /* * AeadAesGCMTls13StateSerializationVersion ::= INTEGER {v1 (1)} * * AeadAesGCMTls13State ::= SEQUENCE { * serializationVersion AeadAesGCMTls13StateSerializationVersion, * minNextNonce INTEGER, * mask INTEGER, * first BOOLEAN * } */ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_serialize_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, CBB *cbb) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *)&ctx->state; CBB state; if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &state, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || !CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&state, AEAD_AES_GCM_TLS13_STATE_SERDE_VERSION)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&state, gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&state, gcm_ctx->mask)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!CBB_add_asn1_bool(&state, gcm_ctx->first ? 1 : 0)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return CBB_flush(cbb); } // See |aead_aes_gcm_tls13_serialize_state| documentation string for // serialization format. static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_deserialize_state(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, CBS *cbs) { struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *)&ctx->state; CBS state; if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &state, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_SERIALIZATION_INVALID_EVP_AEAD_CTX); return 0; } uint64_t serde_version; if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&state, &serde_version) || AEAD_AES_GCM_TLS13_STATE_SERDE_VERSION != serde_version) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_SERIALIZATION_INVALID_EVP_AEAD_CTX); return 0; } uint64_t min_next_nonce; if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&state, &min_next_nonce)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_SERIALIZATION_INVALID_EVP_AEAD_CTX); return 0; } gcm_ctx->min_next_nonce = min_next_nonce; uint64_t mask; if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&state, &mask)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_SERIALIZATION_INVALID_EVP_AEAD_CTX); return 0; } gcm_ctx->mask = mask; int first; if (!CBS_get_asn1_bool(&state, &first)) { OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_SERIALIZATION_INVALID_EVP_AEAD_CTX); return 0; } gcm_ctx->first = first ? 1 : 0; return 1; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 16; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_128_GCM_TLS13_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; out->serialize_state = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_serialize_state; out->deserialize_state = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_deserialize_state; } DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) { memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD)); out->key_len = 32; out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH; out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN; out->aead_id = AEAD_AES_256_GCM_TLS13_ID; out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1; out->init = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_init; out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup; out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter; out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather; out->serialize_state = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_serialize_state; out->deserialize_state = aead_aes_gcm_tls13_deserialize_state; } int EVP_has_aes_hardware(void) { #if defined(OPENSSL_X86) || defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) return hwaes_capable() && crypto_gcm_clmul_enabled(); #elif defined(OPENSSL_ARM) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64) return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_ARMv8_PMULL_capable(); #elif defined(OPENSSL_PPC64LE) return hwaes_capable() && CRYPTO_is_PPC64LE_vcrypto_capable(); #else return 0; #endif } OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))