/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../internal.h" #include "internal.h" int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); } int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); } int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); } int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) { return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->crl_hash, b->crl_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) { return a->cert_info->issuer; } uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) { return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer); } uint32_t X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); } X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) { return a->cert_info->subject; } ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) { return a->cert_info->serialNumber; } const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *x509) { return x509->cert_info->serialNumber; } uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) { return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject); } uint32_t X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) { return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject); } // Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB: // Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const" // arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these // operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring // certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the // "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast. int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) { // Fill in the |cert_hash| fields. // // TODO(davidben): This may fail, in which case the the hash will be all // zeros. This produces a consistent comparison (failures are sticky), but // not a good one. OpenSSL now returns -2, but this is not a consistent // comparison and may cause misbehaving sorts by transitivity. For now, we // retain the old OpenSSL behavior, which was to ignore the error. See // https://crbug.com/boringssl/355. x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)a); x509v3_cache_extensions((X509 *)b); return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->cert_hash, b->cert_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); } int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { int ret; // Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); if (ret < 0) { return -2; } } if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); if (ret < 0) { return -2; } } ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; if (ret) { return ret; } return OPENSSL_memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); } uint32_t X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) { // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { return 0; } uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; SHA1(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md); return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); } // I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, // this is reasonably efficient. uint32_t X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) { // Make sure the X509_NAME structure contains a valid cached encoding. if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0) { return 0; } uint8_t md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; MD5((const uint8_t *)x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length, md); return CRYPTO_load_u32_le(md); } X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { if (serial->type != V_ASN1_INTEGER && serial->type != V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) { return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(x509), serial) == 0 && X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x509), name) == 0) { return x509; } } return NULL; } X509 *X509_find_by_subject(const STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) { for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { X509 *x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) { return x509; } } return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) { return NULL; } return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key); } EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(const X509 *x) { if (x == NULL) { return NULL; } return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key); } ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) { if (!x) { return NULL; } return x->cert_info->key->public_key; } int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) { const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (xk == NULL) { return 0; } int ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); if (ret > 0) { return 1; } switch (ret) { case 0: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); return 0; case -1: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); return 0; case -2: OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } return 0; } // Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference // count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of // each X509 structure. STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); if (ret == NULL) { return NULL; } for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) { X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); } return ret; }