---
title: Introduction
description: Learn about the distinctive logic at work in the Science of Logic
isArticle: true
authors: Filip Niklas (2024)
editors: Ahilleas Rokni (2024)
contributors:
---

# MDX Test Sample: Broken Up For the Purposes of Testing Prepyrus

[Link to actual](https://github.com/systemphil/sphil/blob/main/src/pages/hegel/guides/science-of-logic-introduction.mdx)

## Introduction to the Science of Logic

### The Familiar Logic

This is why Hegel begins, in the introduction to _The Science of Logic_ (SL),
with the following statement:

> In no science is the need to begin with the fact [ *Sache* ] itself, without
> preliminary reflections, felt more strongly that in the science of logic
> (Hegel 2010, 23/21.27).

### The Unfamiliar Logic

> In every other science, the matter that it treats, and the scientific method,
> are distinguished from each other; the content, moreover, does not make an
> absolute beginning but is dependent on other concepts and is connected on all
> sides with other material (Hegel 2010, 23/21.27).

### At the Beginning

> Only after a more profound acquaintance with the other sciences does logic
> rise for subjective spirit from a merely abstract universal to a universal
> that encompasses within itself the riches of the particular: in the same way a
> moral maxim does not possess in the mouth of a youngster who otherwise
> understands well the meaning and scope that it has in the spirit of a man with
> a lifetime of experience, to whom therefore the weight of its content is
> expressed in full force. Thus logic receives full appreciation of its value
> only when it comes as the result of the experience of the sciences; then it
> displays itself to spirit as the universal truth, not as a _particular_
> cognition _alongside_ another material and other realities, but as the essence
> rather of this further content (Hegel 2010, 37/21.42).

### Logic as Mere Form

When logic is considered as a science or knowledge of thinking, it is first
understood that this thinking is "_the mere form_" of cognition that abstracts
from all content (Hegel 2010, 24/21.28). This has two consequences: Firstly,
logic or thinking as mere form is completely devoid of any internal truth and
acts merely as the stepping stone to another's. Secondly, logic is wholly
dependent on extraneous matter to be given to it, for it itself consists only
for _formal conditions_ and not of any _real truth_. Moreover, it can be seen
here that logic is taken _externally_ to its subject matter, which holds latent
an unquestioned metaphysical assumption. As Hegel notes:

> Presupposed _from the start_ is that the material of knowledge is present in
> and for itself as a ready-made world outside thinking; that thinking is by
> itself empty, that it comes to this material as a form from outside, fills
> itself with it, and only then gains a content, thereby becoming real knowledge
> (Hegel 2010, 24/21.28).

Kantian undertones of blind intuitions and empty concepts can also be found in
this assumption (although, to be fair to Kant, he was working from a different
context)(Kant 1998, 194/A51). The idea being that logic or thought are devoid of
any truth _until_ material from the world (which itself is ready-made and
complete unto itself) is given to it.

The further consequence of this assumption is that logic and its subject matter
(here the world) are utterly different from each other; "each turns out to be a
sphere divorced from the other" (Hegel 2010, 24/21.29). As Hegel notes, this
leads exactly to the Kantian position of thing-in-itself, since logic or thought
are utterly other to the world, the world is a complete thing unto itself
logically prior it being given as material for cognition as intuitions. In other
words, the world cannot be thought of with any certainty prior to its
experience; or, put differently still, thought is incapable of coming to any
resolution about its subject matter (be that the world, existence or anything).

> ...when these prejudices are carried over to reason, as if in reason the same
> relation obtained, as if this relation had any truth in and for itself, then
> they are errors, and the refutation of them in every part of the spiritual and
> natural universe is what philosophy is; or rather,since they block the
> entrance to philosophy, they are the errors that must be removed before one
> can enter it (Hegel 2010, 25/21.29).

Curiously, the ancient thinkers, Hegel continues, had a higher conception of
thinking since it was reasoned that only things known in thought, as opposed to
known immediately, where understood to be the truth of the matter. It is, then,
not what is _first_ experienced that is considered true, but what is _thought_
to be so. For example, in the distance an object may appear as a shipwreck but
coming closer it becomes apparent that the object is actually a peculiar hut.
Did the object itself morph between the two states? No, one reasons that
perception gave a certain impression at one point and a different form another,
but that the object had been what it was in both respects. One simply comes to
_realize_ what the thing really was. Here thought is not alien to the world but
is immanent to it, "the _things_ and the _thinking_ of them agree in and for
themselves (also our language expresses a kinship between them)" (Hegel 2010,
25/21.29).

### The Conflict of Determinations

However, Hegel detects a more serious obstacle in this thinking when it is
attempted to be philosophically applied. When, according to this naive position,
thoughts are _only_ thoughts and that real knowledge is the intertwining of
thoughtful form and worldly impressions, it can be easily missed that what are
assumed to be conflicts of the world are really conflicts of ideas. In Hegel's
more technical vocabulary, it is _the conflict of determinations_ (see also Kant
1998, 459/A405/B432).

> The basis of the [conception of modern philosophy is] in the insight into the
> _necessary conflict_ of the determinations of the understanding with
> themselves. - The reflection already mentioned consists in _transcending_ the
> concrete immediate, in determining* and \_parting* it. But this reflection
> must _equally transcend_ its _separating_ determinations and above all
> _connect_ them. The conflict of determinations breaks out precisely at the
> point of connection. This reflective activity of connection belongs in itself
> to reason, and to rise above the determinations ad attain insight into their
> discord is the great negative step on the way to the true concept of reason
> (Hegel 2010, 26/21.30).

Finally, Hegel then points out that as the understanding (according to
transcendental idealism) cannot apply its determinations or concepts to things
in themselves, it must therefore mean that these determinations are in
themselves something untrue and consequently cannot be turned upon itself or
anything else related to pure reason. The standard set for the understanding is
based on experience and empirical objects, but the categories that define these
empirical objects are not themselves empirical&mdash;they are precisely
pure&mdash;and so the categories of the understanding cannot apply to anything
other than sensuous reality. But this is incoherent, since the categories
themselves are pure, their validity cannot come from sensuous reality. "If they
cannot be determinations of _the thing in itself_, still less can they be
determinations of the _understanding_, to which one ought to concede at least
the dignity of a thing" (Hegel 2010, 27/21.31). In this Kantian regime,
according to Hegel, one cannot consistently use the tools by which the
understanding navigates the world to also navigate the realm of ideas and
thoughts, with the result being that the understanding (or the mind) cannot be a
thing, much less be said to exist.

> All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there
> are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to
> us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of
> which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are
> thought (Kant 1998, 135/A15).

In fairness to Kant, however, more emphasis is placed on pure concepts as the
argument of transcendental idealism develops. Kant, in contrast to Hume, places
pure categories or pure concepts in the purview of reason such that these cannot
have their validity or truth established by sensuous reality, but that, rather,
they serve to establish the validity and truth of sensuous reality. There are
also a number of other key concepts&mdash;called _concepts of reason_&mdash;that
never directly interact with sensuous reality, such as ethical principles or the
concept of world (Kant 1998, 394/A311). Indeed, concepts of reason are in this
way genuinely unconditional. With these things in mind, the thrust of Hegel's
criticism is somewhat blunted, since Kant's argumentation does not _entirely_
rest on the intertwining of thoughtful form and sensuous impressions. Yet
Hegel's real target is the fact that transcendental idealism has invalid or weak
means to establish the truth of the very tools of cognition it purports to use
to establish truth _tout court_.

### Logic as Non-Metaphysical

> [W]hat is commonly understood by logic is considered with a total disregard of
> metaphysical significance.

<p
  style={{ textAlign: "right" }}
  className="nx-border-gray-300 nx-italic nx-text-gray-700 dark:nx-border-gray-700 dark:nx-text-gray-400"
>
  (Hegel 2010, 27/21.31-2)
</p>

What is crucially omitted in typical discussions concerning logic is its state
with regards to reality. Logic is not usually understood to exist in the same
way a tree or a squirrel exists (i.e. a _thing_), and Hegel admits that logic
does not have the kind of content that comes readily available unless one thinks
about it carefully. However, this is not due to the nature of logic as much as
it is with how it is being used. "Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not
held together in organic unity, they are dead forms and the spirit which is
their vital concrete unity does not reside in them" (Hegel 2010, 27/21.32).
While the language here is somewhat lofty, the underlying point is clear: when
logic is considered merely as a settled structure, it is not considered how its
many forms and patterns hang together, and especially how they are understood
vis-à-vis the thinking mind, which leaves logic immutable and insubstantial.
These features of logic&mdash;when formally considered&mdash;become brittle and
arbitrary when the full weight of the self-critical, demand of freedom is
brought to bear.

### On the Use of the Term Science

The term `science` (German: _Wissenschaft_) is often used by Hegel throughout
his writings and signifies a larger context than what is commonly understood by
the use of the term. Typically, science is understood to entail inquiries
strictly into the natural world or what can be proven empirically. Science thus
is therefore knowledge of empirical reality. Hegel, along with Kant, Fichte and
others of his contemporaries, expand the notion to include also what can be
proven logically. While science, for Hegel, still concerns empirical knowledge,
it is also knowledge of non-empirical items such as logic, metaphysics, ethics,
aesthetics, religion and even knowledge itself. It is perhaps best to think of
knowledge whenever Hegel speaks about science, insofar as knowledge is a
provable conception (logically or empirically) of something that is neither
exclusively objective or subjective. The class of knowledge that is particularly
concerned with logic, metaphysics or knowledge as such is frequently connoted as
pure knowledge or pure science; "pure" because it is knowledge about knowledge,
or science about science, or the subject matter of logic is strictly not
intermingled with anything other than logic itself.

> Pure science thus presupposes the liberation (_Befreiung_)[^2] fom the
> opposition of consciousness. It contains _thought in so far as this thought is
> equally the fact as it is in itself;_ or the _fact in itself_ in so far as
> this _is equally pure thought_. As _science_, truth is pure self-consciousness
> as it develops itself and has the shape of the self, so that _that which
> exists in and for itself is the conscious concept and the concept as such is
> that which exists in and for itself_ (Hegel 2010, 29/21.33).

[^2]: [Introduction of _The Science of Logic_ in German at Zeno.org](http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Wissenschaft+der+Logik/Erster+Teil.+Die+objektive+Logik/Einleitung/Allgemeiner+Begriff+der+Logik)

Logic, then, becomes the _system_ of pure thinking (Hegel 2010, 29/21.34). Here
Hegel omits the connotation "pure" since a system puts into determinacy what
pure thought turns out to be, and determinacy minimally qualifies between what
is and is not. Likewise, this system of pure reason is no less a science of
logic since logic becomes expounded determinately and what it expounds is the
very evolution of logic. This is admittedly looking ahead, since at the start
the very idea of determinacy cannot be left unquestioned. Indeed, if there is to
be a system of logic (or logic as a system), then this too must develop
immanently from pure thought, from the conception of pure science or, as Hegel
wrote above, pure self-consciousness as it unfolds in its own shape.

### The Evolution of Logic

{/* cspell: disable-next-line */}

> [S]ince Aristotle, [logic] has taken no backward step, but also none forward,
> the latter because to all appearances it seems to be finished and complete
> (Hegel 2010, 30/21.35).

### Dialectic: The Engine of Logic

If the method of logic is something that emerges, develops and evolves, one is
instinctively prompted by the question of _what_ drives logic itself to progress
in the first place? Keeping in mind everything said about indications of the
content above, Hegel's simple reply to that question is:

> What propels the concept onward is the already mentioned negative which it
> possesses in itself; it is this that constitutes the truly dialectical factor
> (Hegel 2010, 34/21.39).

Text

> ...the general idea to which [Kant] gave gave justification and credence is
> the _objectivity of reflective shine_ and the _necessity of the contradiction_
> which belongs to the _nature_ of thought determinations ... [that] such
> determinations are in reason, and with reference to what is in itself, this is
> precisely their nature. This result, _grasped_ in _its positive aspect_, is
> nothing else but the _inner negativity_ of the determinations which is their
> self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life (Hegel 2010,
> 35/21.40).

By _objectivity of reflective shine_, Hegel means that how things _appear_, not
only as they are in and for themselves, is understood to be objectively valid.
That is to say, that appearances gain the status of forming part of reality and
not merely obfuscating it as if they were only a veil that could be permanently
pulled back. Hegel then adds the conclusion that, if appearances are integral to
reality, then reality itself has an inner negativity whereby it is in opposition
with itself between these two determinations, namely, what _is_ the case and
what _seems_ to be case. Or, put differently, the thing is internally disjointed
between how it appears and how it really is. Furthermore, this opposition or
internal negativity is considered positive since it is through this divergence
or conflict that difference (or movement) is engendered. As Hegel confirms: "It
is in this dialectic as understood here, and hence in grasping opposites in
their unity, or the positive in te negative, that _the speculative_ consists"
(Hegel 2010, 35/21.41).
