Protocol

A BIP324 library to establish and communicate over an encrypted channel.

The library is designed with a bare no_std and "Sans I/O" interface to keep it as agnostic as possible to application runtimes, but higher level interfaces are exposed for ease of use.

The async feature includes the high-level AsyncProcotol type which helps create and manage an encrypted channel.

The lower-level Handshake and PacketHandler types can be directly used by applications which require more control. The handshake performs the one-and-a-half round trip dance between the peers in order to generate secret materials. A successful handshake results in a packet handler which performs the encrypt and decrypt operations for the lifetime of the channel.

Feature Flags

• alloc -- Expose memory allocation dependent features.
• std -- Includes the alloc memory allocation feature as well as extra standard library dependencies for I/O and random number generators.
• async -- High level wrappers for asynchronous read and write runtimes using agnostic futures-rs traits.
• tokio -- Same wrappers as async, but using the popular tokio runtime's specific traits instead of futures-rs.

Handshake

Alice and Bob initiate a connection by sending three messages to each other to derive a number of shared secrets. Alice begins the connection by deriving a public/private keypair over secp256k1, the typical bitcoin curve. Alice is known as the initiator. She encodes the public key in the Elligator Swift format (64-bytes), optionally pads it with some random garbage bytes, and sends the message to Bob.

Bob, known as the responder, decodes the Elligator Swift public key, and derives an ephemeral public/private keypair himself. Using his public and private keys, as well as Alice's public key, Bob performs a variation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman algorithm to derive a shared key. From this shared key, Bob derives multiple keys and a session ID using the HKDF algorithm. Next, Bob creates garbage data, and sends his public key, garbage data, an encrypted packet using the garbage data, and a version negotiation to Alice.

With Bob's public key, Alice derives the shared secret and ensures the decrypted packet is authenticated with the garbage Bob sent her. Finally, Alice sends a "garbage terminator" and an encrypted packet using her garbage data, so Bob may authenticate she derived the correct secret and he can decode her messages. Alice and Bob may now freely exchange encrypted messages over the bitcoin V2 P2P protocol.

ChaCha20Poly1305

BIP324 elects to use the ChaCha20Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption with Addition Data (AEAD) algorithm under the hood. This is a combination of the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the Poly1305 message authentication code (MAC). In this context, "authentication" refers to the encrypted message's integrity, not to the identity of either party communicating.

Poly1305 is a purpose-built MAC, as opposed to something like an HMAC using SHA256 which leverages an existing hash scheme to build a message authentication code. Purpose-built introduces new complexity, but also allows for increased performance.

ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are both implemented in this crate to keep dependencies to a minimum.

Development

The implementation is tested against vectors from the BIP324 reference and a number of additional library tests.