https://docs.rs/sequoia-chameleon-gnupg

Sequoia's reimplementation of the GnuPG interface

This is a re-implementation and drop-in replacement of gpg and gpgv using the Sequoia OpenPGP implementation.

Try it out, it is safe!

If you are a power user, you can try out the Chameleon today to see if it covers your use cases. The Chameleon does not directly modify any of GnuPG's data structures, so it is safe to try it out with your existing GnuPG installation and keys.

There are two ways the Chameleon will change your $GNUPGHOME:

• It will create an openpgp-cert-d overlay in $GNUPGHOME/pubring.cert.d (GnuPG will ignore this), unless you are using the default $GNUPGHOME, in which case the default location for the openpgp-cert-d is used. This provides seamless integration with other tools using the common certificate store, such as Sequoia's native sq frontend.

• If you create or import secret keys, the Chameleon will interact with gpg-agent the same way GnuPG would, and gpg-agent will in turn modify $GNUPGHOME.

The Chameleon is compatible with the state of and gpg-agent from GnuPG 2.2.x and 2.4.x. If it discovers state of GnuPG < 2.1.x (i.e. with secring.gpg), it will convert it to 2.2.x state the same way GnuPG would (i.e. import the secret keys into the gpg-agent and add a flag file).

Switching to Sequoia's gpg-sq

To use the Chameleon, you need to install it, and then make sure that it is invoked either directly by you or indirectly by programs instead of GnuPG. There are three ways to do that.

Direct invocation

If you only interact with GnuPG via the command line, then invoking gpg-sq instead of gpg is enough to use the Chameleon instead of g10code's GnuPG.

Replace /bin/gpg

To globally replace g10code's gpg with the Chameleon, install it as /bin/gpg (or /usr/bin/gpg, or wherever gpg is installed on your system; hint: try type gpg in your shell) replacing g10code's gpg, for example using dpkg-divert or a similar mechanism. This is more convenient and robust than invoking it using gpg-sq, but has the downside of being a system-wide all-or-nothing switch.

Take precedence using PATH

If the Chameleon can be found under the name gpg in your $PATH before g10code's gpg is found, it takes precedence. This has the advantage of being more convenient and robust than invoking it using gpg-sq, while allowing a more fine-grained replacement method (for example per-shell if the $PATH is manipulated on a per-shell basis, or per-user if that is done in the shell's startup files).

If you go down this route, you also need to make sure that gpgconf points to the Chameleon, because many programs invoke gpgconf to find the location of gpg, notably those that use GPGME. To that end, we have a shim that can be used from the build directory (if you want to install the Chameleon, or your cargo target directory is different, you need to adapt it accordingly):

$ export PATH=$(pwd)/shim-release:$PATH
$ gpg --version | head -n1
gpg (GnuPG-compatible Sequoia Chameleon) 2.2.40
$ gpgconf | head -n1
gpg:OpenPGP:.../sequoia-chameleon-gnupg/shim-release/gpg

Switching back to g10code's gpg

You can at any point switch back to using g10code's gpg by undoing the replacement method discussed in the previous section.

However, a consequence of not modifying GnuPG's state but using an overlay is that changes made using the Chameleon will not be picked up by GnuPG. Therefore, you need to sync all the changes you made using the Chameleon back to g10code's GnuPG.

For example, if you import a certificate using the Chameleon, it will only be inserted into the overlay, and g10code's GnuPG will not see it. This is also true if you generate a key using the Chameleon: while the secret bits will be known to the gpg-agent, the public certificate will not. Similarly, if you modify the trust database, the changes will only be written to our overlay.

To sync the changes to the certificate store and trust database back, export changes from the Chameleon and import them into g10code's GnuPG:

$ gpg-sq --export | gpg-g10code --import
$ gpg-sq --export-ownertrust | gpg-g10code --import-ownertrust

If you are using the Chameleon and GnuPG side-by-side, it is recommended to either do state changing actions using GnuPG, or sync the changes, either manually or periodically in a cron job.

How to build the Chameleon

First, you need to install Sequoia's build dependencies, as well as the SQLite3 library. Then build the Chameleon from a checkout of this repository:

$ git clone https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-chameleon-gnupg.git
$ cd sequoia-chameleon-gnupg
$ cargo build --release
[...]

The above creates the gpg-sq and gpgv-sq executables, the manual pages, and shell completions. By default, the manual pages and shell completions are put into the cargo target directory, but the exact location is unpredictable. To write the assets to a predictable location, set the environment variable ASSET_OUT_DIR to a suitable location.

Alternatively, you can change the cryptographic library that is used. Note that this will change the build dependencies. Currently, crypto-openssl and crypto-cng are supported, which select OpenSSL and Windows CNG, respectively. To select a different backend, disable the default features and activate the corresponding feature:

$ git clone https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-chameleon-gnupg.git
$ cd sequoia-chameleon-gnupg
$ cargo build --release --no-default-features --features=crypto-openssl
[...]

Running the tests

To run the tests, you also need Sequoia's command-line frontend sq. Then, you can run the tests using cargo:

$ cargo test

How to trace invocations of the Chameleon

If you have a program that uses GnuPG, and you want to see whether it works with the Chameleon, a good way to do that is to run the test suite (or if there is none, just use the program as usual) with a debug build of the Chameleon, and enable the invocation log. The log will log every invocation of the Chameleon with all the arguments given, and whether an error occurred or not.

$ cargo build
[...]
$ export PATH=$(pwd)/shim-debug:$PATH
$ # WARNING: this only works with a debug build!
$ export SEQUOIA_GPG_CHAMELEON_LOG_INVOCATIONS=/tmp/invocation.log
$ # Run your test suite here.  This is an example:
$ (gpg --version ; gpg --lsign-key) >/dev/null 2>&1
$ cat $SEQUOIA_GPG_CHAMELEON_LOG_INVOCATIONS
814360: "gpg" "--version"
814360: success
814359: "gpg" "--lsign-key"
814359:            Command aLSignKey is not implemented.

Status

gpgv-sq

gpgv-sq is feature-complete. Please report any problems you encounter when replacing gpgv with gpgv-sq. gpgv-sq is stateless, you can switch to it by invoking gpgv-sq instead of gpgv, and switch between the implementations without further considerations.

gpg-sq

gpg-sq is not feature-complete. It currently implements a growing subset of commonly used commands and options. Most of the signature creation and verification commands, the encryption and decryption commands, the key listing commands, and some miscellaneous commands are implemented.

Currently, we rely on GnuPG's gpg-agent to handle secret key operations. This is very convenient for users who are already using GnuPG, but it means that you have to have gpg-agent installed. Further, we don't have our own implementation of gpgconf, and we rely on it to start the gpg-agent and downstream users, such as GPGME, also require gpgconf to function.

Trust Models

The Chameleon implements a subset of the trust models implemented by GnuPG, and some specific to Sequoia. The following table shows how the Chameleon and GnuPG interpret different values given to the "--trust-model" parameter.

Name	Chameleon	GnuPG
auto	Auto	Auto
sequoia	Sequoia	✗
sequoia+gnupg	Sequoia+Gnupg	✗
pgp	Sequoia+GnuPG	GnuPG
gnupg	GnuPG	✗
tofu	✗	Tofu
tofu+pgp	Sequoia+Gnupg	Tofu+GnuPG
classic	Sequoia+Gnupg	Classic
direct	✗	Direct
external	✗	External

The trust models are described below.

Auto

The trust model is read from the trust database. If there is no trust database, defaults to pgp.

Sequoia

This is how Sequoia manages the trust roots. Under Sequoia's trust model, only the trust-root from the certificate directory is used as trust root. Trust is managed using the sq pki commands.

This model combines well with GnuPG's native trust model. This is implemented in the sequoia+gnupg trust model, which is the default. However, if you are comfortable with using sq pki to manage trust, you can explicitly select the sequoia trust model to deactivate the gnupg trust model, which is a little bit cheaper, and is easier to reason about.

Sequoia+GnuPG

Combines the Sequoia trust model and the GnuPG trust model.

GnuPG

GnuPG uses the owner trust databases to select trust roots. In addition to ultimately trusted certs, also fully and marginally trusted certs are used as trust roots if they can be authenticated. This is the trust model used in PGP6.

Currently, we don't honor the constraint on the lengths of certification chains (parameter --max-cert-depth), but this will be implemented at some point.

Tofu

Trust-On-First-Use provides asymptotic trust, i.e. as the time goes on, and the observed binding between user IDs and certificates doesn't change, trust into the binding increases.

Tofu+PGP

Combines the Tofu trust model with the GnuPG trust model.

Classic

Like the GnuPG trust model, but disregards trust delegations via trust signatures. This is the trust model of PGP2.

Direct

Uses owner trust values to validate authenticity of user IDs on certificates.

External

Uses the trust database, but refrains from modifying it. This is left to an external program.

Known deliberate divergences

Some features of g10code's GnuPG are deliberately not implemented to improve security, or to reduce complexity in the reimplementation.

This is a non-exhaustive list. If you note a divergence that is not listed here, please open an issue, so that we can either align with GnuPG's behavior, or add the divergence to this list.

Conversely, if you take issue with a divergence listed here, and have good arguments not mentioned here that support aligning with GnuPG on that aspect, please also open an issue.

Weak algorithms are rejected

We reject more weak algorithms than GnuPG by default, notably SHA-1 (see also this section).

Configurable crypto policy

The environment variable SEQUOIA_CRYPTO_POLICY can point to a configuration file (see crypto policy format) that changes which cryptographic algorithms are acceptable. By default, /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/sequoia.config is read, which on Fedora contains a reasonable policy set by the distribution.

Short key IDs are not supported

Short key IDs, aka 32-bit key IDs, are not supported. Creating keys with colliding short key IDs is trivial, so using them to refer to keys is insecure. See https://evil32.com .

When a short key ID is used in an command line argument or configuration file, an error is printed and the operation fails.

We don't use dirmngr

We don't use GnuPG's dirmngr to connect to network services to discover certificates. Instead, we read its configuration file and do the requests ourselves. This is more robust and offers more features, for example, if you have more than one keyserver directive in dirmngr.conf, we will query all keyservers simultaneously.

We don't use keyboxd

We don't use GnuPG's keyboxd to access keybox databases. Instead, we read the certificates directly from the keybox database if we discover one.

We reject --use-embedded-filename

This flag is insecure and may overwrite arbitrary files with attacker-controlled content on decryption. We reject the flag by making the invocation fail. Do not use this flag.

No translation, no localization beyond date and time formats

GnuPG translates all messages and error messages, and even some command-line arguments (LANGUAGE=de gpg --compression-algo unkomprimiert...). We may translate strings in the future, but will never do locale-dependent argument parsing.

Algorithms may be specified by OID in GnuPG

Algorithms may be only be specified using their OpenPGP algorithm IDs and the symbolic identifiers as used by GnuPG. If you absolutely need this, please open an issue.

Non-Functional Advantages

The Chameleon has a number of non-functional advantages relative to GnuPG.

Automatic discovery of certificate updates

The Chameleon includes a component called Parcimonie (after the venerable Parcimonie) that will keep your certificates up-to-date, trying to do so in a privacy preserving fashion.

It will periodically use any enabled auto-key-locate methods to search for updates in the local certificate store using randomized delays trying to de-correlate them. It will use Tor if available.

To enable the Parcimonie component, run gpg-sq --x-sequoia-parcimonie, either manually or using a service manager (a systemd unit file with the name gpg-sq-parcimonie.service is included in this repository). Alternatively, you can use the x-sequoia-autostart-parcimonie option in your configuration file to start it on-demand if gpg-sq is invoked.

OpenPGP Conformance

Sequoia implements nearly all of the OpenPGP RFC4880. The missing bits are either obsolete or insecure. Furthermore, we engage with the IETF OpenPGP working group, and wrote an extensive OpenPGP Interoperability Test Suite to improve interoperability between various implementations. In short, if you use Sequoia to encrypt your data, you can be sure that you can decrypt it with any other OpenPGP implementation.

No more waiting for Trust Database checks

The Chameleon uses a very fast implementation of the Web-of-Trust, and we calculate the trust on the fly without relying on a cache like GnuPG. That means that gpg --check-trustdb is a no-operation for the Chameleon, whereas GnuPG is known to take a long time.

SHA-1 Mitigations

SHA-1 is broken. Unfortunately, SHA-1 is still widely used. To deal with this Sequoia implements a number of countermeasures:

• Sequoia uses SHA1-CD, a variant of SHA-1 that detects and mitigates collision attacks. This protection is also used by GitHub, among others.

• Sequoia rejects all signatures using SHA-1 by default.

On the other hand, GnuPG accepts SHA-1 everywhere without any additional protections.

Collision Protection

Sequoia includes a salt in signatures and self-signatures to defend against collision attacks, among others. OpenSSH does the same thing. Should the collision resistance of another hash be broken, this will frustrate attackers trying to perform a Shambles-style attack.

Multi-threading

Thanks to Rust's safer concurrency paradigms, it is less dangerous and less complicated for the Chameleon to use threads than implementations written in other languages. The Chameleon uses this, for instance, to parse keyrings faster.

Testing methodology

There are two ways we test the Chameleon: we run the Chameleon and GnuPG side-by-side and compare the results, and we use test suites of programs that use GnuPG.

Using GnuPG as Test Oracle

We run experiments that invoke the Chameleon and record human-readable and machine-readable output and side-effects, and compare that to what GnuPG emits. These tests are run when you invoke cargo test, and hence need GnuPG to be installed.

Downstream Test Suites

We use test suites of programs that directly or indirectly use GnuPG to verify that we support the required functionality.

A reoccurring problem when running these test suites is that they may include cryptographic artifacts such as OpenPGP certificates, keys, signatures, and messages. Those are rarely updated, and hence are stuck in time using old packet formats or insecure algorithms.

If you are maintaining a software package that includes cryptographic artifacts in the test suite, please help by regularly updating the artifacts. Further, try to reduce the amount of checked-in artifacts in the first place. Where possible, try to generate the required artifacts in the test.

• notmuch: passes (patches applied: https://nmbug.notmuchmail.org/nmweb/show/20220909161250.715226-1-justus%40sequoia-pgp.org)
• emacs: passes (patches applied: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnu-emacs/2022-10/msg00443.html)
• pass: passes (patches applied: https://lists.zx2c4.com/pipermail/password-store/2022-September/004647.html)

Bugs discovered in the process

• gpg(v) prints the human-readable form of notations to the status-fd, https://dev.gnupg.org/T5667, fixed
• When encrypting, gpg claims DE_VS compliance with non-compliant gcrypt, https://dev.gnupg.org/T6221, fixed
• gpg --faked-system-time "$(date +%s)!" doesn't work, https://dev.gnupg.org/T6222, wont-fix
• GPGME incorrectly parses the signature class in SIG_CREATED status lines, https://dev.gnupg.org/T6223

Funding

This project was made possible and was funded through NGI Assure, a fund established by NLnet with financial support from the European Commission's Next Generation Internet program. Learn more at the NLnet project page.

License

Sequoia GnuPG Chameleon is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. See LICENSE.txt.

Sequoia GnuPG Chameleon is a derived work of GnuPG. It is not a clean-room reimplementation, and it does include parts of GnuPG either literally, or transcribed to Rust. Therefore, parties who claim copyright to GnuPG also have a claim on parts of the Chameleon. See AUTHORS.GnuPG for a list.